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Democratic milestone 
On 30 August, precisely two years after 
the referendum on independence, the 
people of East Timor will go to the 
polls again to elect an 88-member 
Constituent Assembly. But with 
political violence on the rise in Dili, not 
all Timorese welcome this new 
opportunity to vote. 
Thirteen of the Constituent Assemb1ly's members will be directly elected by districts, and the remaining 75 by 
national political party lists. Their task is to 
draft a constitution for East Timor by the end 
of December 2001 . The assembly will have 
the power to decide whether it will become 
the first government of East Timor, or 
whether fresh elections for a government will 
be held under the constitution it draws up. 
Sixteen political parties have registered 
with the independent electoral commission 
to contest the election (see pages 6-7 for 
details of the parties). The National Council 
of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), the political 
umbrella of most of the parties which 
fought for independence, and later formed 
a representative coalition with the UN 
administration, dissolved itself on 9 June. 
On 8 July, 14 of the registered parties 
signed a pact of national unity calling for 
peace and stability, and a climate of mutual 
respect and confidence. 
Some people, particularly in rural areas, 
do not understand the purpose of the 
election; they say that they already voted in 
1999. There is also considerable 
apprehension. Given the violent aftermath 
to the independence ballot, many associate 
voting with extreme violence and disorder. 
Older people compare the current situation 
to the period between 1974 and 1975, 
before the Indonesian invasion, when 
political parties were last organising for the 
Hope and anxiety: Memories of voting in the independence referendum, 1999, are coloured by the 
violence that followed 
prospect of independence. Civil war 
between the two dominant political parties 
led to some 1,500 deaths. 
The UN Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET), non-governmental 
organisations and the Church are all 
conducting civic education programmes to 
ensure that voters understand the significance 
and procedures of the poll. 1lt is disappointing 
that East Timor's consultative body, the 
National Council, has refused to hold national 
consultations on the constitution and has 
blocked proposals for a minimum quota for 
women candidates (see page 3). 
For the election to go ahead 
successfully, CllR calls for: 
• A campaigning atmosphere free of 
coercion or intimidation of any kind. 
• Freedom of speech and assembly, and 
freedom to campaign. 
• Full and adequate voter/civic education 
programmes aimed at fully informing the 
people of the procedures to be followed. 
• Full participation and inclusion of 
minority groups and of women. 
• UNTAET and the East Timar Defence 
Force to prepare adequate contingency 
plans to deal effectively and decisively 
with violence of any kind. 
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Decision time for refugees 
In June the Indonesian authorities 
asked East Timorese refugees in West 
Timor to state formally whether they 
wished to stay in Indonesia or to go 
home. RICARDO TOMAZ reports on a 
flawed registration process. 
J akarta has been under intense international pressure to accelerate the resettlement and repatriation of 
refugees, and increasingly views them as an 
unwelcome economic and political burden. 
To end the stalemate, the Indonesian 
authorities decided to give the refugees an 
opportunity to register themselves and 
their intentions on 6-7 June 2001. 
The UN Security Council immediately 
welcomed the move. The UN High 
Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) 
funded almost half of the costs. It did not 
participate directly in the registration 
process, however, having categorised West 
Timar as a high security risk after three of 
its workers were murdered there in 
September 2000. 
The registration process was supposed 
to allow refugees to choose freely: either to 
stay and resettle in Indonesia and become 
Indonesian citizens, or to return to East 
Timar. A further aim was to ensure that 
the process would be completed in time 
for returnees to take part in the 30 August 
election. 
Militia control 
The Indonesian government, however, 
planned and organised the registration in 
collaboration with Uni Timar Aswain 
(UNTAS - an umbrella organisation of the 
pro-Indonesian militias which control the 
refugee camps in West Timar). The process 
could not, therefore, claim to be neutral, 
free or fair. Several aid workers claimed 
that refugees had been threatened with 
kidnapping or even death if they were to 
choose repatriation. 
UNTAS presented the exercise as a re-
run of the 1999 independence referendum, 
giving the impression that a vote was also 
happening in East Timar. UNTAS appeared 
more concerned with perpetuating the 
refugees camps than it did with the living 
conditions and future prospects of the 
refugees. For the militias, the refugees 
represent bargaining leverage with the UN 
Transitional Administraton in East Timar 
(UNTAET), the Indonesian authorities, and 
the international community. Without 
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them, the militias would become 
irrelevant. Clearly, many militia members 
fear the prospect of being brought to 
account for serious crimes committed in 
1999 and are using the refugees as hostages 
to wrest concessions. Many have sought 
amnesty, but the authorities in East Timar 
have ruled out a blanket amnesty. 
A particularly serious deficiency in the 
process was that only 'heads of the family' 
were allowed to register their intentions. 
Women's views were therefore considered 
irrelevant. It is a serious indictment of the 
United Nations that it condoned such 
blatant disregard for women's rights. 
A further problem was the lack of inter-
national observers. Only 12 international 
observers (from the International Organisa-
tion on Migration, UNTAET, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Brunei, Philippines, China, Japan 
Korea, Norway and Mozambique) came to 
monitor 507 registration stations in 
different part of West Timar, 1,600 
registration officials, 80 field supervisors 
and 4,500 police and military personnel. 
Indonesia was responsible for ensuring 
security during the registration. For this 
purpose the border between East and West 
Timar was temporarily closed and police 
and armed soldiers were deployed to 
prevent disturbances. There were few 
violent incidents, but irregularities were 
reported, including vote-buying. Some 
people who were not refugees voted more 
than once. 
Questionable results 
The outcome of the registration was that 
an overwhelming majority of refugees 
indicated their desire to stay in Indonesia. 
Only 1.1 per cent opted to return to East 
Tim or. 
UN officials and non-governmental 
organisations have questioned these 
results, and the validity of the process. 
They argue that the voting was conducted 
in an atmosphere of intimidation, that the 
majority of the refugees lacked accurate 
and unbiased information, and that many 
did not fully comprehend the implications 
of their decision. 
A month later, only about half of the 
1,200 or so refugees who said they wanted 
to return to East Timar had actually done 
so. Some refugees say that they will return 
to East Timar when they feel it is safe -
perhaps after the election. 
It is clear that the United Nations, in 
endorsing the registration process in West 
Timar, has made large concessions of 
principle, and achieved very little. Few 
refugees have moved on either to 
resettlement in Indonesia or back to East 
Timar. The international community 
should continue to insist on the removal of 
the militas from the West Timorese refugee 
camps, and on international organisations 
conducting a new registration process 
where the refugees can state their 
preferences in fully neutral conditions. 
Timorese NGOs call for long-term commitment 
The East Timor National NGO Forum has called on international donors to make a 
long term commitment to supporting East Timorese civil society and a future 
Timorese government. 
Speaking at the Donors' Meeting for East Timar in Canberra in June, Arsenio Bano, Executive Director of 
the NGO Forum, said: 'We want to see a 
culture of transparency and accountability 
and a culture of partnership built between 
government and civil society, to ensure 
that the future objectives of development, 
particularly poverty-reduction, are 
achieved. 
'This will need a more comprehensive 
mechanism for government-civil society 
relations to be established by both current 
and future administrations. It will also be 
important for donors to make a long term 
commitment to support a future Timorese 
Government and civil society partners.' 
Bano praised the commitment shown 
by the donors, and welcomed the 
questions they raised with the UN 
Transitional Administration. The NGO 
Forum also called for consideration of an 
international tribunal for war crimes in 
East Timar, and for broad consultation in 
the constitution-making process. 
Ms Ajiza Magno, speaking on social 
and economic issues, said, 'I hope that 
efforts will continue to strengthen the role 
of East Timorese women in the nation's 
development, and that essential invest-
ments in education and health will not be 
jeopardised when hard budget choices are 
being made. These are a long-term 
investment in our nation.' 
The case of Juliana 
dos Santos 
On 29 March 2001 CllR and Kirsty 
Sword Gusmao presented a petition 
before the UN Commission on Human 
Rights on behalf of Juliana dos Santos. 
Unfortunately, the arrest of her captor 
lgidio Manek, on unrelated charges, 
has not led to her release. 
J uliana, then aged 15, was kidnapped from Suai and taken across the border into Indonesian West Timor at the 
height of the militia violence which 
followed East Timor's independence vote 
in August 1999. Manek paraded her as a 
war prize before members of her 
community, saying: 'this is the child of 
the pro-independence scum; they crow 
like roosters and die like mice'. 
Juliana has been held in captivity, 
without news from home and allowed to 
talk only to Manek's immediate circle of 
militia collaborators. She has now borne 
his child. Her case-worker from the UN 
High Commissioner on Refugees was one 
of the three murdered by militias in 
Atambua in September 2000. Manek is 
prime suspect in the murder of about 200 
East Timorese in the Suai area, including 
Juliana's younger brother, Carlos. 
With pressure on the Indonesian 
military mounting, following the 
campaign on Juliana's behalf, a meeting 
was arranged with her parents, just over 
the border from West Timor. However, in 
the presence of so many Indonesian police 
and militia, Juliana chose not to go home 
to Suai. Her parents feel that she was 
intimidated. Kirsty Gusmao also suspects 
that Juliana is suffering from 'Stockholm 
syndrome', identifying with her captor. 
Manek was arrested in early July not 
for her abduction or even on charges 
relating to the Suai massacre, but because 
his Lakusaur militia is thought to be 
responsible for the death of an Indonesian 
solider during a riot in the border town of 
Atambua. 
CIIR's petition called for the prompt 
establishment of a war-crimes tribunal to 
prosecute perpetrators of violations of 
humanitarian law committed in East 
Timar, and for a substantial increase in the 
resources allocated to the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 
Quotas ruled out 
In March 2001 the East Timorese 
Women's Network (REDE) lost an 
important campaign to secure quotas 
for women on party lists of candidates 
for the constituent assembly elections. 
They had aimed for a quota of a 
minium 30 per cent of women 
candidates. 
The National Council, the governing body composed of UN and East Timorese representatives, had itself 
put forward the proposal, following 
resolutions passed at the First East 
Timorese Women's Congress and the 
Congress of the National Council of 
Timorese Resistance (CNRT) last year. But 
during a few weeks in February and 
March, opponents in the United Nations 
and among East Timorese political parties, 
fearing the consequences of opening up 
access to women, organised against the 
clause. When the legislation for the 
Constituent Assembly election came up 
for ratification in March, CNRT leader 
Xanana Gusmao was forced to reverse the 
recommendation when, one by one, the 
opponents of quotas for women called for 
the clause to be dropped. The campaign 
had been internationalised, and appeals 
had gone as high as UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan. The UN Electoral Affairs 
Department remained deeply opposed to 
quotas, although they had been used 
successfully elsewhere in the world. 
The women's network was particularly 
disappointed that women National 
Council members, who owed their 
presence on the council to REDE's 
organising and lobbying, were prevailed 
upon to denounce quotas as vehemently 
as some of the male political leaders. 
Many of the REDE women felt that 
their cause had been set back decades . 
The likelihood of women candidates 
being put forward anywhere near the top 
of the lists of most political parties seems 
remote. The women foresee an assembly 
News 
Putting women in the picture: CllR is 
supporting women's organisations in East 
Timor in their struggle for gender equity. The 
picture shows CllR's Advocacy Officer for East 
Timor, Catherine Scott (centre), with Laura 
Abrantes (left) and Maria Dias, East Timorese 
representatives at the Assembly of the World 
Union of Catholic Women's Organisations in 
Rome in March 2001. 
Serious Crimes Unit, so that its work can 
be completed in a timely and adequate 
fashion. 
in which women and their concerns will 
have scant representation. 
Despite this setback, women have 
developed a two-pronged strategy for 
strengthening their participation in the 
election. First, they are attempting to lobby 
the political parties to field women 
candidates. Second, they are educating 
women in communities to participate in 
the debate about the constitution and to 
participate in the election. The UN 
Transitional Administration's Gender Affairs 
Division has been supporting their efforts. 
The UN Development Fund for 
Women (UNIFEM) organised a four-week 
workshop from mid-May to mid-June on 
political participation for women. More 
than 150 women from organisations all 
over the country took part. The gathering 
set up a caucus of 12 women to look in 
more depth at women's participation in 
politics. The Gender Affairs Division will 
provide training for those who decide to 
run in August's elections. 
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Pastoral exhortation on politics in East Timor 
From Bishop Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo 
My Brothers and sisters in Christ 
This year is another crucial moment for all 
of us. It will be a 'political year' because of 
the gradual transfer of UN power and 
authority to East Timorese leaders, the 
elections and the formulation of a 
constitution. I < 
It is an important year because it offers 
us the historical opportunity to lay the 
foundation for a just, peaceful and 
sustainable society. 
We need a vision of a new society, 
also a vision of Church of the future, a 
Church of true disciples, a true 
community, a participatory Church, a 
Church of the poor, committed to social 
transformation. 
I wish to reiterate the Pope's message 
during the Jubilee year, that a 'complete 
change of perspective will be needed. It is 
no longer the well being of any one 
political, racial or cultural community 
that must prevail, but rather the good of 
humanity as a whole. The pursuit of the 
common good of a single political 
community cannot be in conflict with the 
common good of humanity' . 
The situation in East Timor 
It is the duty of the Church to scrutinize 
the signs of the times and to interpret 
them in the light of the Gospel. It is the 
awareness of her mission of 'service', a 
mission distinct from the function of the 
State. 
What are the signs of the times in 
East Timor? 
In the economy, we see mass poverty and 
unemployment especially among the 
young people. There is a danger of 
introducing an economic system that is 
purely market- and profit-making 
oriented, that encourages greed and 
selfishness. This is a false economy. 
In the political arena, we see the 
emergence of elite politics: politics 
dominated by elite class, or influential 
families or business enterprises, politics 
that focuses on personalities rather than 
on issues. 
In the cultural field, we see the danger of 
foreign culture so alien to East Timorese way 
of life, consumerism, greed, individualism 
and escalating violence, especially violence 
directed against women. 
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The Church's role in political sphere 
The Church in East Timor seeks it guidance 
in the Social Doctrine of the Church which 
contains a set of teachings that serve as 
principles of judgment, of reflection, and of 
action in the social order. 
This exhortation summarises and 
applies the social doctrine to our political 
situation. 
a) Because of its very nature and mission 
as the proclaimer of the Gospel of 
Jesus, the Church has to play a major 
role in the political field . Its nature 
and mission is primarily spiritual; it is 
all about entering the kingdom of 
truth, of justice, peace and love. It is 
about total salvation: salvation of the 
individual and communities from 
everything that oppresses and 
dehumanises the human person. 
b) The Church's role is in the moral and 
religious area of political life and 
activity. Political activity is a human 
activity. A human activity has a moral 
or religious dimension. It may lead 
either to grace or to sin, to God or 
away from God. Examples would be 
graft and corruption, cheating in 
election. 
c) The Church provides guiding moral 
principles for the proper governance of 
the community and acts as a 
complement of the government in this 
role. The Church also acts as a moral 
conscience of government, because 
the competence of the Church is in 
the moral and religious dimension of 
political life. The proper role of the 
Church then in relation to any 
government is one of 'critical 
solidarity', critical when required, 
solidarity when necessary. 
d) The Church's role in partisan politics, 
or party politics must also be 
understood. The Church is the People 
of God. As people, it is made up of lay 
people, of clergy (Priests and Bishops) 
and religious (Sisters, Brothers, and 
Priests). Obviously lay people can 
participate in partisan politics; openly 
support a political party, run for public 
office. They can 'work to explicitly 
promote the election of leaders of true 
integrity to public office'. 
e) It is wise and prudent policy for priests 
and religious to refrain from partisan 
Bishop Belo 
involvement. The reason is simple: 
they are religious leaders of the 
community. If they were to involve 
themselves in party politics, they 
would divide the community. There 
are generally many different political 
choices and no political party or 
political programme can really claim 
to be the only option compatible with 
the Gospel. 
f) In these times of great but delicate 
nation building we need to remember 
that Church and State are working for 
the same common good, each in its 
own sphere of competence. The 
competence of the Church is with the 
moral and religious dimension of 
social, political, economic, and 
cultural life i.e., of human life. Deep 
understanding of the Church's 
primary role is needed on the part of 
all in order to avoid division and 
conflict. The common good is the 
common objective. Sacrifices for the 
common good, such as party loyalty 
and personal or family interests will 
have to be willingly and heroically 
made. The good of our new country is 
a moral value that everyone has to 
defend and promote. 
I appeal to members and leaders of 
emerging political parties to exercise 
prudence in their discourse and to 
focus on issues, programmes and 
platforms rather than on personal 
attacks; on the future rather than the 
past; and if we need to reflect on the 
past let us all learn lessons from it and 
not dig up the old grudges and pains. 
continued on page 5 -+ 
Church 
The constitution-making process in 
Timor Lorosa'e: The Church's position 
Earlier this year, the Catholic church in 
East Timor issued the following 
statement on the constitution. 
Introduction 
1. The new Independent Nation State of 
East Timor will require a permanent 
Constitution which is the highest law of 
the land, deriving its legitimacy from the 
people who enjoy sovereign power in the 
territory of East Timor. A permanent 
Constitution could then be amended 
only in the terms set down in the 
Constitution. 
2. A Constitution is like the house of our 
dreams. You cannot build it overnight. 
You need to consult everyone who will 
live in it so that it is properly designed to 
suit the interests of everyone. The design 
takes a long time. It cannot be done in the 
heat of elections for the first 
democratically elected government in a 
new country. And it definitely cannot be 
done while 10 per cent of the voter 
population is still out of the country. 
3. Most countries which undergo rapid 
change still take a long time to finalise the 
terms of their Constitution. South Africa is 
a good example. They had a simple 
interim Constitution to fill the gap until 
they were ready to adopt a permanent 
Constitution. 
4. During the next year, we, the people of 
East Timor will need to elect a legislative 
body and a President who will be the 
legislature and executive of the 
government of East Timor. Political parties 
will be formed. Those parties will have 
different policies and will be seeking 
power for different political leaders. They 
may also have different views about an 
appropriate Constitution for East Timor. 
continued from page 4 
g) The Church will conduct its own 
moral and religious programme 
regarding politics. This programme 
aims to educate the people, provide 
guidelines on choosing political 
officials, prepare young people in 
Catholic schools or parishes for 
political leadership, and to work for 
conversion to new values as against 
It would be a mistake to confuse voters 
with the need to elect candidates with 
different policies about health, education, 
etc, as well as different views about the 
Constitution. 
5. A Constitution is not satisfactory 
unless all major groups and political 
interests in the society are agreeable to the 
terms of the Constitution. The 
Constitution should be the document of 
the people. Such agreement only comes 
after a process which is truly inclusive, 
consultative and responsive to the 
different perspectives in the community. 
At the moment, we the people of East 
Timar do not have yet the house of our 
dreams. We do not even have a 
constitutional shelter. It is time to erect a 
temporary constitutional house which can 
establish a legislature, judiciary and 
executive which can then supervise the 
task of drawing up a permanent 
Constitution. This task would take several 
years. 
Proposal: An interim constitution 
and four-step process 
1. In the meantime, there is a need for a 
simple, interim Constitution that has a 
guaranteed limited life span of three to 
five years. This Constitution should be 
finalised by an interim Constitutional 
Commission which reports to the 
National Council. The Commission 
should be served by constitutional 
experts. Its members should be 
representative of the different districts and 
the different sectoral groups (women, 
youth, farmers etc) in East Timor. The 
National Council would have power to 
amend the model proposed by the 
Constitutional Commission. But it would 
the values of the politics of greed, 
violence and corruption. 
The Diocese is circulating the detailed 
guidelines on politics as a reflection paper. 
We encourage our religious and political 
leaders to discuss, study and reflect on this 
document. It will be important to include 
this in your homilies. Study the document 
in your meetings and gatherings. 
For this purpose, God's grace is 
not have the power to extend the life of 
the interim Constitution. 
2. It is our view that there should be a 
distinct process for constitution-making 
and election. If the first democratically 
elected legislature were also the 
Constituent Assembly which would vote 
soon after the election to finalise the 
permanent Constitution, the elections for 
that Constituent Assembly would be very 
confusing for everyone. The people would 
be voting for too many things with one 
vote. No one would know what they were 
really voting for. 
3. When the first Legislative body is 
democratically elected under the terms of 
the interim Constitution, the legislative 
body should then pass a law for the 
establishment of a permanent Constit-
utional Commission which would have 
the task of proposing a permanent 
Constitution for adoption by the people 
either by popular referendum or by a 
super-majority of the elected Legislative 
body. 
4. An interim Constitution approved by 
the appointed National Council will not 
be perfect; it will not have democratic 
legitimacy; it will not have a long life 
span. It will be a pragmatic interim 
measure which allows the people to elect 
the leaders and to vote for the political 
parties they want to govern them. Then 
comes the difficult task of setting up an 
inclusive process for drafting a permanent 
Constitution reflecting the aspirations of 
all Timorese groups and not just the 
preferences of the winners at the election. 
Such a constitution would then have 
democratic legitimacy and a long life span 
because the different groups could own 
the process and the outcome. 
absolutely necessary, the Church would 
therefore urge that everyone of good will, 
men and women of different faiths, offer 
fervent, sincere and unceasing prayer to 
God, while actively working toward 
building a new, transformed Timar Lorosa'e 
in accord with the Kingdom of God. 
Msgr. Carlos F X Belo 
Bishop of Dili 
January 2001 
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Political parties participating in the Constituent Assembly elections 
Party Leader Date founded Membership and support Ideology 
Apodeti (fimorese Popular Frederico Almeida Santos 27 July 1974 Formerly Pro-Indonesian, but accepted the Liberal democracy 
Democratic Association) Costa 1 999 ballot result and is re-launching itself 
ProReferendo 
Associacao Social Francisco Xavier do Amaral 2001 New party using original name, and president, Left-wing 
Democrata de limor (ASDT) of Fretilin 
Appears to have links with the CPD-RDTL, 
which is not contesting the election, but has 
been behind many recent incidents of political 
vio lence 
Partai Democratic Maubere Paulo Pinto, October 2000 New party, linked w ith Apodeti 
Gregorio Sebastiao Lobo, 
Armindo Sanches t 
Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for Lu Olo 1974 Major party with large rural fo llowing Left-wing, founded by social I 
the Independence of East limor) Membership estimated at 150,000 democrats and Marxist-Leninists I 
KOTA Clementino dos Reis Amaral 1974 Formerly a pro-integration party, now supports Original ly monarchist and pro-
(Sons of the Mountain Warriors) independence Indonesian, it rejected the offer of 
autonomy within Indonesia in 1998 
and jointed CNRT 
Partido Democrata Cristao Antonio Ximenes 2000 Small party based on Christian social justice Seen as left-wing 
(Christian Democratic Party) values 
Partido Nacionalista Timorense Abi lio Araujo 1999 Small party, leader has a controversial past Believed to support CPD-RDTL 
(limorese Nationalist Party) 
PPT (limorese People's Party) Dr Jacob Xavier and Herminio 2000 Founded by anti-independence supporters 
da Silva da Costa based in West Timor, and has exerted some 
control over the return of refugees 
Partido Social Democrata limor Mario Carrascalao 2000 New party, could draw off some of the Centre ground, moderate 
Lorosae (Social Democratic Party Fretilin/UDT vote 
of East Timor) 
Partido Socialista de limor Avelino Coelo da Silva 1990s Split from Fretilin, links with student and Marxist-Leninist 
(Socialist Party of limor) worker movements, strong youth element 
Trabalhista (limor Labour Party Paulo Freitas da Silva 1974 Previously linked to Indonesia, but now pro- Democratic socialist party 
independence/ democracy 
Uniao Democrata-Crista de Vicente da Si lva Guterres 1998, in 1500 members throughout East Ti mo r's 1 3 Linked with Partido Popular in 
limor (Christian Democratic Portugal districts Portugal; member of the 
Union) Also has Christian Democratic organisations for International Union of Christian 
women, youth and workers Democrats 
Members are mostly Catholics, pro-Christian 
outlook, but no longer linked with PDC 
Partido Democratico Fernando de Araujo, President 2001 New party formed by students' and women's Moderate alternative to Fretilin 
organisations. 
Partai Liberal Armando Jose Dolvado de Silva 2001 No information available 
Parenti I Flaviano Pereira Lopez 2001 No information available 
Uniao Democratica limorense joao Viegas Carrascalao 1974 One of the first East limorese political parties, Conservative 
(UDT - limorese Democratic wanted federation with Portugal, had coalition 
Union) with Fretilin in 1974. It backed independence, 
but later mounted a failed coup which led to 
civil war and 1500 deaths. Joined CNRT in 
1998, but withdrew in 2000 
.. With acknowledgement to Pat Walsh, East Ttmor s po/1t1cal parties and groupings, ACFOA, March 2001 
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Policies Gender Language policy 
• Timorisation of the administration Provisional use of Portuguese as the official language 
. Multi-party democracy while Tetum is developed . 
• Dialogue and reconciliation English as a second language to be compulsory in 
• Human rights for men and women schools 
• Free market economics, foreign and local investment 
• Universal free health system 
• Campaigning for the Restoration of the original Democratic Republic of Tetum as national language, English, Portuguese and 
East Timor proclaimed on 28 November 1975 Indonesian as interim official lanugages until new 
• Affirms the original priorities: economy, education, health, employment, parliament rules on the issue 
equality, environment 
• Favours presidential/parliamentary system, directly elected president 
j • Supports democracy, pluralism, tolerance, dialogue and peace East Timor should sign the Portuguese for official lanuage, Tetum for national 
I • East Timor to join UN and to sign up to key treaties Convention for the Elimination of all language 
I . Development of agriculture, fishing, cooperatives, literacy, tourism, forms of Discrimination Against 
I, 
natural resources and foreign investment. Women 
. Supports the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Schools should teach three foreign languages: 
• Promotes Timorese culture, especially the traditional kings - the liurai Portuguese, Indonesian and English 
• Multi-party system, with executive presidency Tetun should be developed and become the national 
• Poverty reduction through development of agriculture, fishing, livestock, language 
tourism and coffee 
. Multi-party democracy Strong emphasis on the rights of 
• President as head of state, not head of government women and minorities 
. People-oriented economy 
• 'Third way' between CNRT 'dictatorship' and integration with Indonesia Bahasa Indonesia as the official language alongside 
• Recognises 1999 ballot result, respects the UN Transitional Administration Portuguese 
• Supports regional integration through membership of the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Xanana Gusmao for president 
Support for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pluralism, 
participation, social justice, minimum wage, rights for women, children and 
minorities 
• Multi-party democracy Supports equality between men and English and Portuguese should be the official 
• Human rights and equality women languages for the transition period 
• Reconciliation Vociferously opposed quotas, but is Tetun should be developed 
• Workers' rights fielding women candidates in first, 
• Free education and health services third and fifth place on party lists 
• Land reform Favours legalisation of divorce and 
• Prohibition of death penalty banning of prostitution and polygamy 
• Equality and re-distribution of political and economic power Claims 45 per cent of members are Tetun and English should be the two principal 
• Pro-trade union women languages 
• Equal opportunities and higher standards in education Supports equal opportunities and 
• Protection of customs and traditions choice for women 
• Human rights-based culture 
• Regional disarmament 
• A secure transition to democracy The rights of women and minorities Portuguese should be the official language, Tetun 
~ • Multi-party system with directly elected president, division of powers should be defended should be the national language, and English taught between president and prime minister as the first foreign language 
j . Parliamentary system reflecting ethno-linguistic diversity • Market economy • Free education and health services 
• Preservation of Timorese culture 
• Participatory democracy 
• Respect for human rights 
• Market economy/selective intervention 
• Equality in education system 
• Social welfare/solidarity 
. Reliable security/defence system 
• Presidential system with options for a second term 
• Centralised system of government 
• Election of district administrators by the local community 
• Role for elders to solve village-level problems using customary law 
• Pensions for all ex-Portuguese and Indonesian public servants 
• Pensions for retired Falintil members, their widows and orphans 
--
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Slow progress to prosecutions 
Crimes against humanity and other 
serious crimes committed by 
Indonesian security forces and pro-
Indonesian militia in East Timor during 
1999 have yet to be addressed. 
Although Indonesia has relinquished its 
claim to the territory and authority 
currently rests with the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAEn, Indonesia's human rights 
legacy will remain a matter for 
international concern until 
perpetrators are brought to justice. 
LUCIA WITHERS, Researcher at the 
Indonesia and East Timor Desk of 
Amnesty International, reports. 
Th e human rights situation in East Timor was once again on the agenda of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights (CHR) when it met for its 
5 7th session in Geneva from 19 March to 
27 April. Discussion focussed primarily on 
the past and, in particular, on events in 
1999, when pro-Indonesian militia 
groups, backed by the Indonesian security 
forces, tortured, raped and murdered 
hundreds of independence supporters, 
forcibly expelled tens of thousands to 
Indonesia and systematically destroyed 
much of the country's infrastructure. 
A statement by the Chairperson of the 
CHR addressed the responsibility of both 
the Indonesian government and UNTAET 
to investigate crimes against humanity 
and other serious crimes in East Timor 
during 1999, and to bring the perpetrators 
to justice. It welcomed the first measures 
taken by UNTAET and strongly supported 
the continuation of its investigations. It 
also welcomed steps taken by the 
Indonesian government, including efforts 
by the Attorney General to investigate 
crimes and the recommendation by 
Indonesia's parliament to establish an ad 
hoc Human Rights Court on East Timor. 
The CHR urged Indonesia to set up such a 
court without delay. 
Acknowledging the responsibility of 
the international community, the CHR 
also promised to monitor developments 
closely and to consider further action. 
An act of faith 
However, the Chairperson's statement 
lacked any mention of an international 
criminal tribunal on East Timor. This 
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reflects the preference of most governments 
to place their trust in the Indonesian 
authorities' ability and willingness to 
investigate and prosecute their own 
military, police and government officials. As 
the months go by without trials being held, 
it is becoming increasingly apparent that 
this is a considerable act of faith. 
In September 1999, immediately after 
the independence ballot, when the 
violence in East Timor was at its height, a 
special session of the CHR was called. It 
condemned the actions of the Indonesian 
security forces and militia and called for a 
International Commission of Inquiry on 
East Timor (ICIET). A UN Security Council 
resolution called for those responsible to 
be brought to justice. 
Following a visit to East Timor in late 
1999, the ICIET recommended further 
investigations and an international court 
to bring suspects to trial. Three UN Special 
Rapporteurs also concluded, after a visit to 
East Timor in November 1999, that if, 
after a matter of months, Indonesian 
efforts had failed to yield results, an 
international criminal tribunal on East 
Timor should be established. 
It is now a matter of 20 months and 
there is little sign that Indonesia plans to 
put suspects on trial for actions in East 
Timor. One obstacle after another has been 
thrown into the path of justice. Criminal 
investigations have been slow and of 
questionable quality. The Indonesian 
parliament took months to adopt new 
legislation to establish human rights 
courts to try gross violations of human 
rights. The final legislation was enacted in 
November 2000 but, although an 
improvement on earlier drafts, does not 
fully conform to international standards of 
independence and impartiality. 
Protecting the perpetrators 
In the meantime, a debate raged over 
whether this new legislation could be 
applied to crimes which occurred before 
its adoption: in August 2000 a 
constitutional amendment had prohibited 
the retroactive application of law. This 
move was widely seen as an attempt to 
protect senior military and government 
officials from prosecution. However, the 
crimes that come under the jurisdiction of 
the human rights courts are crimes under 
international law. Even if they were not 
codified in national law at the time they 
were committed, the state has an 
international responsibility to act. 
Given the intensity of the debate, the 
announcement on 21 March 2001 that 
Indonesia's parliament would recommend 
the establishment of an ad hoc court on 
East Timor was something of a surprise. 
However, on 23 April, just days after the 
CHR had adopted its statement 
recommending that perpetrators be 
brought to trial without further delay, a 
Presidential Decision (Keppres 53/2001) 
limited the court's jurisdiction to the post-
ballot period only. This would deny justice 
to the hundreds of victims of violations 
which occurred in the months preceding 
the vote, including two major cases which 
had already been investigated by the 
Indonesian Attorney General's office. 
After an outcry from national and 
international human rights groups and 
the international community, Indonesia's 
justice minister promised that the 
Presidential Decision would be redrafted. 
By mid-July 2001 this had not been done 
and the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court announced that trials would be 
delayed further because judges had yet to 
be appointed and trained. In the 
meantime, the leadership crisis in Jakarta 
has virtually immobilised the 
government. The new government of 
Megawati Sukarnoputri will depend 
heavily on the support of the military, and 
may be unable or unwilling to pursue the 
East Timor cases. 
Investigations in East Timor 
UNTAET's investigations and prosecutions 
have progressed much more slowly than 
expected. The UNTAET Serious Crimes 
Unit has set itself a target of completing 
by the end of the year investigations into 
10 cases which it has identified as 
priorities. However, even this modest 
target seems unlikely to be fulfilled, owing 
to a lack of experienced investigators, 
prosecutors, and interpreters, poor 
management and insufficient political 
support. 
A panel of judges, one East Timorese 
and two international, has been 
established to try the 1999 cases. It has 
made decisions on some murder cases and 
the first, long-awaited trial for crimes 
against humanity began on 10 July. 
However, trials have been delayed 
repeatedly for reasons including 
insufficient court capacity, poorly drafted 
indictments and the failure to translate 
evidence into Bahasa Indonesia, the 
working language of the East Timorese 
judiciary and defence lawyers. In the 
meantime, the right of suspects to a fair 
trial within a reasonable time is being 
infringed and victims are being denied 
their right to justice. (See article below on 
the problems of the justice system.) 
Of equal concern is the lack of an 
agreed plan for pursuing investigations of 
serious crimes in East Timar after 
UNTAET's mandate expires on 31 January 
2002. There has been little capacity-
building to prepare East Timorese to 
continue the work. There is only one East 
Timorese prosecutor and no East 
Timorese investigator in UNTAET's 
Serious Crimes Unit. Nor is there a clear 
commitment from the United Nations to 
provide continued support for the 
investigations and prosecutions in East 
Tim or. 
The United Nations is currently in the 
process of deciding the shape and size of the 
UN presence in East Timar after indepen-
dence. Investigating the 1999 events is a 
large and complex task which takes time and 
will require continued financial and other 
support for the coming years. If the 
problems experienced by the Serious Crimes 
Unit are to be overcome and its task 
completed, the United Nations must 
commit adequate resources to it now. It 
must also use its influence to persuade 
Indonesia to cooperate with UNTAET. This 
means, among other things, transferring 
evidence, witnesses and suspects, in 
accordance with the agreement signed by 
UNTAET and Indonesia in April 2000 which 
Indonesia has not fulfilled. 
The investigations in East Timar are 
only one side of the story. The 
international community must also 
consider how it will achieve its other goals: 
• bringing to justice perpetrators of 
crimes against humanity and other 
serious crimes committed in East 
Timar who are resident in Indonesia; 
Justice 
• strengthening the Indonesian justice 
system to make it sufficiently robust 
and independent to try all human 
rights cases, whether they took place 
in East Timar or in Indonesia itself. 
Successful prosecutions in Indonesia 
would be the best option . But if the 
country continues to display reluctance to 
fulfil its international obligations, 
demands for an international criminal 
tribunal will become even more insistent. 
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that 
states have an obligation to prosecute and 
punish crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and other crimes subject to 
universal jurisdiction, whether the crimes 
were committed by their own nationals or 
those of other states. If persons suspected 
of committing such crimes in East Timar 
travel to states outside Indonesia, those 
states have a duty to try them, or extradite 
them to a state which can do so. 
The view expressed are those of Lucia Withers, and not 
necessarily of Amnesty International. 
Building a legal system 
The UN Transitional Administration has 
failed to build East Timorese capacity 
to run an effective justice system, 
according to the East Timorese NGO 
Forum. This is jeopardising defendants' 
rights to a fair trial and public 
confidence in the new system. A 
document prepared by the forum for 
the World Bank Donors' Meeting on 
East Timor, held in Canberra in mid-
June, made the following criticisms: 
Court administration and basic 
resources 
The present approach appears to be that a 
judicial system simply requires judges, 
without a specialised judicial admini-
stration. Judges and lawyers are not 
necessarily equipped for an administrative 
role. The legal system needs needs staff 
with experience in court administration. 
The Special Panel for Serious Crimes 
has no means of recording trials - for 
example tape recording or detailed 
minute-taking. The Court clerk, who is 
not always present in Court, takes some 
notes but this is no substitute for 
professional transcription. The judges 
therefore Jack an accurate record of the 
evidence presented during the trial when 
they prepare a judgment. This seriously 
compromises the ability of either party to 
conduct an adequate appeal. The judges 
rely on their own notes, taken on a laptop 
computer in court. 
The registry of the court is often 
unable to perform its basic functions, 
including publicising court hearings and 
maintaining court files . Cases are listed in 
an ad hoc manner, with no centralised, 
easily accessible source of information 
about cases. Until recently it was rare for a 
list of even the current day's cases to be 
posted outside the court. The prosecution 
and defence have little notice of 
forthcoming cases, while the public 
receives no information at all. In cases of 
significant public interest, where family 
members and local communities must 
travel long distances to come to court, this 
is clearly inadequate. 
Similarly, access to public court 
records, an important aspect of the 
human right to a fair trial, is virtually 
impossible. The registry does not even 
have a photocopier, and the nearby police 
office will make copies only if the registry 
brings its own paper. The judges and 
prosecutors have little confidence in the 
court registry and therefore hesitate to 
relinquish original documents to it for fear 
that they will be misplaced. 
Strong management and basic training 
in the importance and operation of court 
administration are desperately needed. 
Language 
The Special Panel for Serious Crimes of the 
Dili District Court has four working 
languages : English, Portuguese, Bahasa 
Indonesia and Tetum. However, in 
practice its working languages are English 
and Bahasa Indonesia. The international 
prosecutors, the international mentors of 
the defenders and the two international 
judges use English. The East Timorese 
defenders and the East Timorese judge use 
Bahasa Indonesia, or Tetum when 
addressing a defendant or witness who 
speaks only Tetum. 
There is a shortage of qualified 
interpreters. There is only one 
English/Tetum interpreter, so that at times 
a Bahasa Indonesia/Tetum interpreter has 
been used for defendants. The result is an 
continued on page 10 
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continued from page 9 
awkward combination of the judges 
speaking in English, one interpreter 
translating from English to Indonesian, 
and a second translating from Indonesian 
to Tetum. On occasion, the East Timorese 
judge h as to t ranslate , or one of the 
internation al judges has to ask a question 
first in English and then in Portuguese. 
Defendan ts with little or no formal 
educat ion already find it difficult to 
understand legal terminology in court 
proceedings. The problem is compounded 
by the language difficulties. Defendants in 
several cases have clearly found it difficult 
to understand the judges' questions. The 
questions which pose the greatest 
difficulties appear to be whether the 
defendants have had access to pre-trial 
rights and whether they understand the 
indictments against them. 
It is understood that the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) has 
provided simultaneous translation 
equipment for the courts, but no one 
appears to have been trained to use the 
technology and it has not been installed. 
In any case, the Dili District Court has an 
intermittent electricity supply and no 
generator of its own to keep the 
equipment running. The Court of Appeal 
is currently being equipped with the latest 
audio visual technology, but again, the 
NGO Forum is unaware of anyone being 
trained to use it. 
Research facilities 
No provision has been made for the 
research facilities required by judges and 
defence lawyers. As there is no functioning 
court library, internet access is a minimum 
requirement for research. Judges and 
lawyers need to consult the comparative 
and international jurisprudence relevant 
to their decisions. Yet neither the judges 
nor the public defenders have internet 
access. They are reduced to using UN 
internet cafes. 
Capacity building 
East Timar has a shortage of lawyers. 
There has been some training and a 
mentor system operates at the court, but 
international consultants have been 
rotating in and out and the public 
defenders are so busy that they can rarely 
find time for training. 
There are only three assisting 
international public defenders, some of 
whom have never practised criminal law, 
and none of whom speaks Indonesian or 
Tetum. The nine East Timorese defenders 
who have been formally appointed to 
cover the whole country have little, if any, 
practical legal experience and have 
received insufficient training in such areas 
as international human rights law. 
Lawyers working privately and in local 
legal organisations face even greater 
difficulties. 
Most of the Serious Crimes 
prosecutors, however, are international 
staff with extensive experience. 
Threat to defendants' rights 
The problems outlined above have serious 
implications for the rights of defendants 
to a fair trial. Areas of concern include: 
• equality before the law without 
discrimination; 
• access to effective legal representation; 
• the right to a trial within a reasonable 
time; 
• the right of defendants to understand 
the nature of the charges against them 
and the conduct of the proceedings; 
• proper right of appeal, in the absence 
of a transcript of proceedings. 
Vulnerable groups within the 
community, including women, illiterate 
people and youth are at particular risk. It 
is essential to give higher priority to 
resource provision and capacity building 
for administration of the Special Panel, if 
defendants are to receive a fair trial. 
Lack of monitoring and 
accountability 
The only independent reporting of the 
Special Panel hearings comes from the 
Judicial System Monitoring Programme, 
an as yet unfunded project implemented 
by the East Timorese Jurists' Association 
(ANMEFTIL) and the East Timorese 
Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring 
and Analysis (La'o Hamutuk). Monitoring 
and reporting are absolutely necessary to 
promote the observance of international 
human rights standards, and to identify 
where further reform is needed. 
The Truth, Reception and Reconciliation Commission 
On 19 June East Timor's governing 
body, the National Council, passed 
legislation to establish a Truth, 
Reception and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRRC) to foster processes 
of community reconciliation and truth-
telling about human rights violations. 
CATHERINE SCOTT looks at the 
implications. 
The purpose of the TRRC is to establish the t ruth about human rights violations that occurred in 
East Timor between 1974 and 1999. It is 
also intended to encourage the refugees 
now in West Timor to return to East Timor 
in time to vote in August's elections for 
the Constituent Assembly. Many refugees 
are afraid to return because they fear 
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revenge attacks from neighbours against 
whom they committed crimes during the 
Indonesian occupation. 
According to the steering committee 
tasked with setting up the commission, 
the TRRC will: 
Send a clear message that an 
independent East Tim or will not 
permit impunity or allow bad 
precedents to be set. [ .. . ] It will 
advance reconciliation by deterring 
acts of revenge and promoting 
restorative justice. Its processes will be 
rooted in East Timor's religious and 
traditional dispute resolution 
practices. But it will ensure that they 
comply with human rights norms, 
respect the humanity of both victims 
and perpetrators and are administered 
independently, transparently and in 
an even-handed way throughout East 
Timor. The Commission process will 
allow East Timor's new justice system 
to concentrate its limited resources in 
serious crimes and spare East Timor 
massive expense and on-going conflict 
and litigation. 
The TRRC will deal only with less 
serious crimes such as theft, assault, arson, 
the destruction of animals or crops, and so 
on. There will be no amnesty for serious 
crimes such as murder and rape, which 
will be dealt with by the courts. 
The commission, to be set up in 
September, will be led by from five to 
seven national commissioners nominated 
by the people and is intended to operate 
for two and a half years before reporting 
to the government. It will record and 
document personal stories which will be 
consolidated with other research into a 
final authoritative report. 
People who committed less serious 
crimes will be free to approach the 
commission. Local leaders, chaired by a 
regional commissioner, will convene a 
meeting of perpetrators, victims and local 
community members to discuss the crime 
and an appropriate form of reparation, 
such as community work, financial 
reimbursement, or public apology. If these 
agreements are honoured, the perpetrator 
will be spared future prosecution. 
Perpetrators who do not use the 
commission process, however, will not be 
able to avail themselves of such 
exemptions from legal prosecution. 
Statements will be examined by a 
Community Reconciliation Process 
Committee which will decide whether 
cases should be referred to the community 
process or to the General Prosecutor. A 
great deal will depend on the clarity of the 
criteria used to make these decisions. 
Models 
Truth commissions have become popular in 
the past 20 years as a mechanism for 
shedding light on history and addressing 
human rights violations. The South African 
TRC, which worked from 1996 to 2001, is 
one of the best known. It was the first to 
offer a reprieve after truth-telling as a 
compromise between the demand for 
blanket amnesty and that for judicial 
prosecutions. However, many victims who 
testified felt that justice had not been served 
as perpetrators were freed in exchange for 
giving an account of their actions, without 
even having to express remorse. 
Since the beginning of last year, the 
steering committee in East Timor has 
explored several different reconciliation 
models, and a succession of experts from 
other countries have visited to give advice. 
Two experts, Paul Van Zyl and Priscilla 
Hayner, have given advice on establishing 
the East Timorese commission to the 
Human Rights Unit of the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) . 
Van Zyl is the former chief Executive 
Officer of the South African Truth and 
Reconcilation Commission, and is now 
based at the International Centre for 
Transitional Justice in New York; Hayner is 
an independent writer and consultant at 
the same centre and has recently 
published a book comparing 20 truth and 
reconciliation processes around the world. 
A visit to East Timor by two members 
of the Guatemalan Recovery of Historical 
Memory Project (Remhi) in February this 
year, facilitated by CIIR, created 
enthusiasm among the Timorese who met 
them for a Guatemalan-style story-
collecting process . This could be 
mainstreamed throughout the East 
Timorese parishes, provided the Church 
leadership is enthusiastic enough to take it 
up. Such a process could be built into the 
TRRC's methodology. 
Justice: how? 
The clamour for justice for the severe 
human rights abuses in 1999 and 
throughout the Indonesian occupation 
has been growing steadily. The question is 
how to obtain it. A key concern will be the 
TRRC's relationship with the other 
existing and potential institutions for 
investigating and trying cases of human 
rights violation in East Timor. These 
mechanisms are the UN Serious Crimes 
Unit, which is investigating 10 serious 
incidents that took place in 1999; the 
fledgling East Timorese judicial system; 
and the international tribunal which 
many people inside and outside the 
country have called for. 
The dangers of incoherence 
Whatever the model or combination of 
models used to achieve justice, it is 
essential to have a properly coordinated 
national strategy for administration of 
justice, with clear procedures for all to 
follow. Events in Suai early in the year 
showed the harm that could be done by 
an incoherent approach. 
The local community had arranged for 
a prominent militia leader to return from 
West Timor, promising that no harm 
would come to him. The agreement was 
that if his return went well, he would 
subsequently bring across many more 
refugees whom the militias had prevented 
from returning until then. However, once 
he arrived in East Timor, the Serious 
Crimes Unit arrested him, thereby 
compromising both the strategy of the 
local leaders and the trust which was 
building between the parties. There was a 
further setback to negotiations when 
misinformation about conditions in the 
jail where the militia leader was being 
held travelled back to West Timor. 
The existence of the TRRC should not 
become an excuse for failure to proceed 
Justice 
with an international tribunal for crimes 
against humanity. It h as become 
increasingly obvious that Indonesia is 
neither willing nor able to prosecute the 
perpetrators of gross violations of 
humanitarian law either in East Timor or 
elsewhere (see article on page 8) . On 19 
June, the East Timorese National Council 
called for an international tribunal to be 
established. 
The justice system 
The Serious Crimes Unit has suffered from 
lack of resources and is now in danger of 
failing to complete the rather limited 
programme of work it set itself before the 
UN Transitional Administration's mandate 
expires at the beginning of 2002. The few 
perpetrators brought to account so far 
have committed less serious crimes. 
The commission's activities will 
probably add to the burdens on the 
judicial system, which is already 
struggling to fulfil its functions (see article 
on page 9) . The East Timorese NGO Forum 
supports the basic concept of the TRRC. It 
is concerned, however, that given the 
popularity of truth and reconciliation 
processes, funding and resources will be 
disproportionately allocated in the 
commission's favour, and away from the 
justice system. 
An additional problem is that if the 
commission starts work quickly, it could 
produce more serious criminal cases than 
the justice system can cope with. There is 
also a need for witness protection for 
serious crimes. 
The commission is more likely to 
succeed if the judicial system on which it 
depends has the resources and expertise to 
do its job properly. The international 
community must find the political will to 
provide adequate resources for the East 
Timorese criminal justice system so that 
the population of East Timor can move 
forward to independence more 
confidently. 
Above all, it is important to remember 
the people the process is supposed to be 
for. Some South African observers, after 
reflecting on their own truth recovery 
system, observe that often these processes 
can feed elite political and economic 
agendas at the expense of the victims they 
claim to serve (see article on page 12). The 
East Timorese have a right to hear the 
truth about what has happen ed to them. 
But for the process to be constructive, it is 
best to h ave all the essential elements in 
place first. 
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A word to the wise 
In Timor Link No. 48 of December 1999, 
PIERS PIGOU supported the idea of 
setting up an East Timorese truth 
commission. As a former staff member 
of the investigation unit of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) and one of the few 
vocal critics of some aspects of the 
process there, he has retained a close 
interest in other TRC processes. Here, 
he reflects on plans for a Truth, 
Reception and Reconciliation 
Commission in East Timor. 
I am very concerned that some of the primary architects of the South African TRC are so involved in advising on 
other countries' processes, especially 
because no evaluation seems to have 
taken place of the South African 
experience . Despite the tremendous 
achievements of the South African 
process, there has been very little honest 
criticism of where it went wrong. 
Those setting up the East Timorese 
Commission must avoid ra1smg 
unrealistic expectations of what the 
Commission can do. In South Africa, 
those who testified before commissioners 
were often promised things that never 
materialised - in particular, that their 
cases would be followed up. Actual 
achievements fell well short of potential 
ones. There were many false promises and 
wasted opportunities. Despite this, much 
was achieved, and there is a natural 
tendency to hide behind this . 
Because I have criticised the 
Commission I have been labelled as 
opposed to it. This is not the case, and I 
support certain aspects of its work. Indeed, 
I raised many issues relating to the TRC 
with a range of people in East Timor 
during the tense period in the run-up to 
the 1999 independence vote. I discovered 
that leaders on all sides (including 
religious leaders) opposed a TRC process. 
Nonetheless, there was a general 
acknowledgement that 'truth telling' 
could be of some use, but the notion of 
investigations and subpoenas was 
unpopular. Some people favoured a 
general amnesty! In contrast, people on 
the ground, especially those in local 
offices of the Council of Timorese 
National Resistance (CNRT), favoured a 
detailed review of the past, and opposed 
amnesty. 
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Who benefits? 
Avoiding amnesty is almost certainly a 
wise decision . In South Africa, that has 
been a big failure in most respects. 
Perhaps as a consequence of failing to set 
any real guidelines and having too many 
committees operating at the same time, 
many of the cases in which amnesty was 
granted look questionable on closer 
scrutiny. In most cases the stories 
presented by perpetrators were not 
investigated, so in effect, amnesty was 
granted on the basis of an untested 
version of events. In many instances, what 
was touted as a victim-friendly process 
seems to have benefitted only 
perpetrators. Many have been cheated, 
not only of an opportunity for justice, but 
also of an opportunity to find the truth. 
The truth commission must provide 
for adequate time to complete its work. 
Much depends on the size of the 
operation and the processes to be 
followed. The public hearings of the South 
African TRC consumed enormous 
amounts of time and resources. The result 
was an unrealistic schedule that harmed 
other components of the TRC's work. It is 
to be hoped that in East Timor the 
commission will be a roving entity, 
getting out to the rural areas, and in a 
position to extend the time period for 
operations if required. The East Timorese 
commission has wisely allotted time to 
setting itself up. This is something we 
failed to do in South Africa and later 
regretted. 
Another crucial aspect of the work is to 
secure usable and relevant information. 
This requires a major investment in the 
process of taking statements, which is a skill 
that takes practice. In South Africa many of 
the 20,000 statements collected were of 
little use. Victims do not simply deliver 
nicely packaged testimonies: it often takes 
hours to tease out full chronological details 
of a particular violation. If the East Timorese 
Commission intends to pass on material for 
the purpose of criminal investigations, its 
documentation will need to be both 
coherent and relatively comprehensive. The 
TRRC should therefore invest heavily in this 
part of the process. Even when its work is 
over, the submissions will provide an 
invaluable archive that can be used for years 
to come for a whole range of processes. 
South Africa's TRC failed adequately to 
probe the structural issues of abuse, either 
in the apartheid regime or within the 
liberation movements. This meant that the 
TRC report shed little or no light on the 
structural relationships within the security 
forces and between them and other 
agencies in the state and civil society. 
South Africans do not even have a clear 
explanation of the responsibilities of the 
numerous security police sections. In the 
end, we were left with limited knowledge 
of how the system actually worked. 
Political will 
The East Timorese non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) are rightly 
concerned that the UN Transitional 
Administration and the world community 
will see the TRRC as a satisfactory 
alternative to effective and comprehensive 
investigations and prosecutions. This is 
not simply a matter of reluctance to 
allocate resources, but one of political will 
and the overwhelming desire of certain 
powers to appease Indonesia. The 
commission should also examine the role 
and complicity of foreign powers in the 
period under review. We should be alive to 
the possibility that these 'transitional 
justice' mechanisms can feed elite 
agendas, and that what is touted as a 
human rights-friendly process can actually 
develop into quite the opposite. 
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